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STATEMENT OF CASE 
NATURE OF THE 
This is a divorce matter. Appellant hereinafter be referred to as Dr. Reed. Respondent 
will hereinafter be referred to as Ms. Reed. The scope of this appeal will address Judge Wayman's valuation 
and award of some of the parties' community property, Judge Wayman's fmdings as to Ms. Reed's income 
for purposes of setting a child support amount, Judge Wayman's ruling that Dr. Reed should pay a portion 
of Ms. Reed's attorney fees and costs and Judge Wayman's rulings with respect to certain post trial motions. 
B) TRi\NSCRIPT IDENTIFICATION: Transcripts have been prepared of the trial and several post trial 
hearings. The transcripts will be identified as follows and will be referred to in this Brief as follows: 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT. The trial took place on January 13 and January 14, 2011. References to 
trial transcript shall be identified as the "TRIAL TRANSCRIPT" together with the appropriate volume, page 
and line number. 
TRt\NSCRlPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing: Judge Wayman announced his decision on the 
record on January 28,2011. References to transcript in this Brief shall be identified as "TRANSCRIPT: 
Court's Oral Decision Hearing", together with the appropriate page and line number. 
TRAt~SCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing: Several motions were heard after trial which have been 
consolidated one transcript. contains the transcripts for hearings which took place on April 
2011, 2011, n."'~rnnp,. 7, 2011. to transcript in 
be identified as ...:....::::~=~="-="-"-"=~= , together with appropriate page 
number. 
23,20 on 
several motions before him as well as a couple which had been taken under advisement at earlier hearings. 
References to transcript this Brief shall be identified as "TRAt"'JSCRIPT: Januarv 23" 2012 Motions 
Hearing", together the appropriate page and line number. 
APPELLANT'S 1 
21,20 a hearing was 
Care, Inc., 
to pay to the Shoshone exchange for the release 
on several 
Services, 
stock shares 
awarded to Dr. Reed in the two corporations. The shares were being held by the Sheriff's Office. 
transcript will be referred to in this "TRA.'NSCRIPT: Mav 21. 2012 Motions Hearing". 
C) COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS: 
Ms. Reed filed her divorce complaint on December 22,2009. R. VoL 1, pAS-55. The case went 
to trial on January 13 and January 14,2011. At the end of the second day of trial, and based upon the 
agreement of the parties, Judge Wayma..T1 orally ordered that as of January 14,2011, the parties be 
deemed divorced. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: VoL II, p. 439, L. 20-25. 
On January 28, 2011, Judge Wayman announced his decision and his decision is contained in the 
TRAJ."\l"SCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing. In accordance with his decision, Ms. Reed's attorney 
prepared an equalizing judgment in favor of Ms. Reed and against Dr. Reed in the amount of $198,642.00. 
This judgment was entered on February 24,2011. R. Vol. I, p.98-99. In accordance with his decision, Ms. 
Reed's attorney also prepared a second judgement in favor of Ms. Reed and against Dr. Reed in the amount 
of$ 1 0,000.00 for attorney fees and costs. This judgment was also entered on February 24, 2011. R. Vol. 1, 
p.96-97. Neither judgment addressed property "v~u~,,". debt distribution, t'l1C'TfV'U or child .on1""'"'''''''-
On 2,2011, was Dr. R. 1, p. 1 
101. 
on March 15,2011. A copy 
was <H',,,""'i.',",U to cover was 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL L/L'~n,L".-, OF . This cover sheet to 
the Court's Oral Decision Hearing was att..ached, was by Judge Wayman and the cover 
transcript were the on April 7,2011. R. 1, p. 104-186. 
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Despite the designation of this document as a Final Decree, Dr. Reed does not hpl'P1,rp it 
constitutes a 'Judgment" or a "Decree". I.R.C.P.52 requires the Court to find the state 
conclusions law and direct the entry an appropriate judgment. The TRAt'JSCRIPT: Court's Oral 
Decision Hearing falls within the provisions of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw under 1.R.C.P.S2(a). 
A "Judgment" or "Decree", as that term is defined in I.R.C.P.54(a), is not to contain the court's legal 
reasoning, findings of fact or conclusions of law. Because most, if not all, of the TRANSCRIPT: =~~ 
Oral Decision Hearing consisted of Judge Wayman's findings offact and conclusions oflaw, the FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE do not constitute a 
"Judgment" or "Decree" under I.R.C.P.54 (a). 
It is also obvious that Judge Wayman did not consider the statements he made during his decision 
to constitute either a "Judgment" or "Decree" . At the conclusion of his decision, as he asked Ms. Reed's 
attorney to prepare an appropriate decree, prepare a judgment concerning litigation costs and also prepare 
an equalizing judgment. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 75, L. 1-8. 
On June 20, 2011, an Amended Final Decree of Divorce was entered. R. Vol. 1, p. 208-229. This 
Amended Final Decree of Divorce divided and awarded the parties' personal property and debts. It 
addressed custody and child support. In paragraph XVII ofthe Amended Final Decree of Divorce, Dr. Reed 
was again ordered to pay Ms. Reed $198,642.00 to equalize the property distribution. R. Vol. 1, p. 218. This 
paragraph further provided that if Dr. Reed did not pay, the Court would sign a civiljudgment in Ms. Reed's 
favor upon presentment. In paragraph XVIII of the Amended Final Decree of Divorce, Dr. Reed was ordered 
to pay Ms. Reed attomey fees and costs in the amount of $10,000.00. R. Vol. 1, p. 218-219. This paragraph 
stated that if Dr. Reed did not pay, " ... the Court shall sign a civil judgment upon presentment in favor 
of Plaintiff in the amount of$l 0,000.00 to bear interest at the statutory rate." Page 12 of the Amended Final 
Decree of Divorce (R. Vol. 1, p. 219) was signed by Ms. Reed's attorney, who represented that she had no 
objection to either the fonn or content of the Amended Final Decree of Divorce. 
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On 8,20 1, Ms. Reed applied tor a writ of execution. The 
a to 
One writ of execution was issued 
on the two February 
respect to both judgments. 
III 
of execution nor the writ itself referred to either the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
1, p. 230-233. 
seeking the writ 
and Final Decree 
of Divorce entered on April 7, 2011 (R. Vol. 1, p. 104-287) or the June 20,2011, Amended 
of Divorce.(R. Vol. 1, p. 208-229) as the judgments authorizing the issuance of the writ. 
Decree 
Ms. Reed did not obtain the civil judgments required by the Amended Final Decree of Divorce (R. 
Vol. I, p. 218-219) before she obtained the writ of execution. The writ incorporated both of February, 
2011,judgments, but erroneously stated that bothjudgments had been entered on February 22,2011, instead 
of February 24,2011. R. Vol. 1, p.234-239. 
The writ was given to the Shoshone County Sheriffs Office to execute on Dr. Reed's shares of 
stock in Mountain Health Care, Inc., and 200 shares of stock in Mountain Health Services, P.C.. On July 
15, 2011, a return of service was filed with the Court stating that the writ of execution had been served on 
Terry Spohr as an agent for the corporations, but was being returned as unsatisfied. R. Vol. 2, p.307-316. In 
response to the Interrogatories which had been served on Mr. Spohr as agent for both corporations, the office 
administrator, Paula Olson, stated that no physical shares of stock had ever been issued. She further stated 
that Dr. Reed had been paid $5,000.00 as a partial 
R. Vol. 2, p. 310. 
out lnTPrp'''TC in Mountain Services, P.e. 
On July 18, 2011, Ms. Reed, through counsel, filed an objection to the answers provided by the 
corporations concerning the stock in both corporations. R. Vol. 2, p. 349-352. Part of the relief requested 
was an order from the Court requiring both corporations to the shares of stock Dr. Reed was entitled 
to receive and to deliver a sufficient number of shares to the Shoshone County Sheriff s Office to satisfY the 
judgments. This motion was scheduled hearing several times the actual hearing on the motion taking 
place on September 28, 2011. 
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On 25,2011, of Appeal was on Vol. 2, p. 
On August 25, 201 Dr. Reed a mC)tlOlll for stay SeeKH1lg to stay <>v".""Y,,-.n on 
reconsideration former had filed could be heard. R 2, p. 369-371. On 
September 16, 2011, he also an objection to Ms. Reed's request that the Court order the two 
corporations to issue the stock shares, which had been awarded to him, and deliver the shares to the Shoshone 
County Sheriff's Office. R Vol. 2, p. 380-387. motion was scheduled for hearing on September 28, 
2011, at the same as motion concerning the stock filed by Ms. Reed's attorney. 
A hearing on several motions discussed above took place on September 28,2011. A transcript 
has been prepared of this U'-"Ullll;':' and is included as part of the TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing. 
On September 30,2011, an order was entered which required Mountain Health Services, P.C., and 
Mountain Health Care, 
corporation and to deliver 
to issue all of the stock certificates for all shares Dr. Reed held either 
to the Shoshone County Sheriff's Department. R. Vol. 2, p. 422-424. This 
Order required this be done within 10 days. On April 19, 2012, the corporations filed a motion with 
court wherein they stated that shares had been delivered to the Shoshone County Sheriff's Office on 
October 7,2011. R. Vol. 3, p. 705-707. 
2, p. 
On October 21,2011, a in Support of Motion for Reconsideration was filed on behalf of Dr. 
R. 2, p. 467-485. On October 25,2011, an Order was entered which stayed ofthe 
R Vol. 2, 
R Vol. 
bond in the amount required I.A.R.13 
n .... "_".,,'"u was filed on of Dr. 
On , Dr. a 
and memorandum. R Vol. 2, p. 425-488. hearing on this motion was scheduled for November 
7,2011, and was heard with Dr. ,av,.'vu to reconsider a.l1d motion to set aside award of attorney 
in favor of Ms. Reed. The """'''''''r'~1" hearing is located at TRA..NSCRIPT: ...!..!!~~~~L!!2 
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Hearing, p. 68-99. set aside the JUUl",Ul'-'HC "fir,m.'" fees discussed three 
set above on motions by Dr. Various Motions 
==1:>' p. 93-95. November 15, 1, an Order was entered award attorney fees 
contained in the previous judgments. R VoL 3, p. 567-569. This order directed Ms. Reed to an 
appropriate application for the award of attorney fees within 14 days of November 7,2011. 
On November 21,2011, Ms. Reed filed a Memorandum of Costs and Fees. R. VoL 3, p 570-64 
On December 2,2011, Dr. Reed, through counsel, filed an Objection to the Memorandum of Costs. R. VoL 
3, p. 642-654. The Objection was scheduled for hearing on January 23,2012. On December 2, 2011, a 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on behalf of Dr. Reed. R. Vol. 3, p. 665-659. 
At the hearing which took place on January 23, 2012, Judge Wayman "reinstated" the $10,000.00 
judgment for a partial award of attorney fees. TRl\NSCRIPT: Motions Hearing, p. L. 21-25. found 
that his finding concerning the balance owed on one debt secured by the house awarded to Ms. Reed was 
high by $2,000.00 and attributed this to a "scrivener"s error. TRANSCRIPT: ~~~~~~. p. L.23-
25. He reduced the equaIizingjudgment amount from $198,642.00 to $196,642.00 to correct this error. 
TRANSCRIPT: Motions Hearing, p. 25, L. 15-25, p. 26, L.l-lO. On January 25,20 a Third 
Notice of Appeal was filed. R VoL 3, p. 662-666. 
On 2,2012, an 'V'H~'-'L,-ON was at 
the January 23, 20 to Order in the 
record it was VIHHL,",,". MOTIONS was u",,,,,-,,,",u to a H>",<>""U to 
November or December of 20 13. i\n 
ar<l'n.,rH"the Tn£)]'lnn to a.U'~lW~Hl was pntprp·r! on December 13, 2013. A j U1,'v"'",,",,,, Notice 
Appeal was filed on 20,2012. R 3, p. 714-718. 
On April 20, 20 a Motion Domestic Relations Orders was filed by Ms. 
Reed. While the Clerk was to include this LH'-!<LVU in the record, it was omitted. A 
BRIEF 6 
copy Motion of Qualified Domestic .. ""., ...... 'vu~ Order was ", .. ,''-.. "" .• to 
was the a"t·p..,..,,,, Court in late November or December 20 
An <n"!>,n1-ir. cr the to augment was entered by the Idaho Supreme Court on December 2013. 
A Fourth Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on Apri120, 2012,. R. Vol. 3, p. 714-718. 
On May 14,2012, Dr Reed a Defendant's Response and Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for 
of Qualified Domestic Relations Order. R. VoL 4, p. 828-833. A hearing was held on May 21,2012, 
and a transcript of this hearing has been prepared. It will hereinafter be referred to as "TRANSCRIPT: May 
Motions Hearin!:!:" as was discussed above. During the hearing, Judge Wayman ruled on several motions 
which had been filed by Ms. Reed's attorney. 
written judgment for attorney fees was not entered until June 8, 2012. R. Vol. 4, p. 876-878. 
Because the $10,000.00 judgment for attorney fees had not been entered as of the date the Fourth Amended 
Notice of Appeal was filed on April 20, 2012, a Notice Concerning Entry afFinal Appealable Order was 
filed on July 12, 2012 (R. VoL 4, p. 950-955) to perfect the earlier appeal from the 
award pursuant to the provisions on.A.R.17 (e) (2). This rule states that where a notice of appeal is filed 
from an appealable judgment or order before the formal written entry of such order, the appeal shall become 
valid upon the and placing of the stamp of the clerk of the court on the judgment or order. While this 
rule the will without the refiling of the of appeal once the 
June 8, 20 
20 a 
course of action appeared to to anew 
UUlUH.,U domestic relations orders. R. Vol. 4, p. 
,.pt',rp,nplnt accounts. R . 
• '~~H"U to the order were several of Authorization directed to the entltH:S managing the ,.ptirp''YIP,nt 
accounts. The of Authorization transfer of the accounts Dr. name to Ms. 
Sahlin to of Authorization on Reed to 
APPELLAi'lTS BRIEF 7 
traJlstt;rthe accounts to Ms. On June Dr. Reed 
Mountain Services R. 
On June 13,2012, Ms. Reed applied and obtained a new writ PVf'('ll,j-,,,,n R. Vol. 4, p. 901-905. 
In her application, she again referred to the two judgments which had been entered in February of20 11. On 
July 12,2012, a Motion to Quash Writ was filed by Dr. Reed. R. 
a Memorandum in opposition to the motion to quash was filed on 
4, p. 946-949. On August 13,2012, 
Reed. R. Vol. 4, p.977-987. 
On August 16,2012, a Response Brief was filed to Ms. Reed's Memorandum. R. Vol. 4, p. 988-998. On 
August 16,2012, an Amended Response Brief was filed on Dr. Reed. R. 5, p. 1042-1053. 
On August 20, 2012 a hearing was held on the Motion to Quash. Certified copies of the minutes of this 
hearing were attached to Dr. Reed's Motion to Augment record. On December 6, 2013, the Idaho Supreme 
Court granted the motion to augment and these minutes are now part the record on appeal. As is shown 
in the minutes, Judge Wayman denied the motion to quash. No order has been entered with respect to this 
hearing. As of the date of the hearing, the briefing on Dr. Reed's first had been completed. 
On July 19,2012, Dr. Reed tendered into the Court the sum $10,100.00 as full payment for the 
judgment against him for attorney fees. R. VoL 4, p. 960-963. tender was made pursuant to the 
provisions of I.C.IO-HIS to reserve the award of attorney fees in favor Ms. Reed as an issue on appeal 
and to avoid an execution sale pursuant to fee Ms. Reed filed a motion on August 
9,2012, requesting that Judge Wayman enter an order directing that these be paid to her. The motion 
is missing from the present record. A hearing on this motion was scheduled for August 20,2012, and after 
the hearing, an order was entered on 
counsel. This order was also omitted by 
30,2012, that these funds be paid to Ms. Reed through 
District Court Clerk in Clerk's record. Dr. Reed filed a 
motion to augment the record with the Idaho Supreme Court dated November 26,2013, and asked that the 
record be augmented with this order. A copy of the order was attached to the motion. The motion was 
granted. On September 4, 2012, Ms. Reed filed a satisfaction of judgment with respect to the money 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 8 
udj~,ent for attorney fees. R. Vol. 5, p. 1056-1057. 
On 4,2012, Ms. Reed filed an TT1El<lVlT to obtain a v"''-''-'UC1VU and obtained a 
execution to collect the February 24, 2011 Judgment for Equalization of Property Settlement, less 
$2,000.00 which had been subtracted by Judge Wayman at an earlier hearing. R. Vol. 5., p. 1058-1061. On 
October 23, 20 an execution sale was held in Shoshone County with respect to the sale of Dr. Reed's 700 
shares Mountain Health Care Inc., stock. Ms. Reed purchased these shares which Judge Wayman had 
valued at $642,045.00 (TRANSCRlPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 52, L. 14-18) with a credit bid 
the amount of$1.00 against her judgment. R. Vol. 5, p. 1106-1108. Dr. Reed's shares in Mountain Health 
P.C. were also sold atthis sale for $15,000.00. R. Vol. 5, p. 1109-1111. Judge Wayman had valued 
these shares at $34,000.00. TR..A.i"fSCRlPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 56-L. 12-16. Mountain 
Services, P.C., however, had already paid Dr. Reed $5,000.00 as a down payment on the purchase 
of these shares. 
were on the first appeal with Dr. Reed's Appellant's Briefbeing filed on Apri130, 2012, 
CR. Vol. 3, p. 719-768), Ms. Reeds's Respondent's Briefbeing filed on May 30, 2012,(R. Vo1.4, p. 834-871) 
and Dr. Reed's Reply Brief being filed on June 20, 2012 (R. Vol. 4, p. 910-937). These Briefs covered the 
issues and orders addressed in the first appeal. 
On July 17,2012, a Notice of Appeal was filed. R. Vo!' 4, p. 956-963. appeal was from the 
four orders which had been entered in June of 20 12, which included the written Judgment for Attorney 
the Order Granting Motion for Relief from Stay, the four QDROS, and the Order Re: Motion for Entry of 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order. (Listed on page 2 of the Notice of Appeal at R. Vol 4, p. 957). One 
of the orders appealed from, as stated in the Notice of Appeal, was the June 8, 2012, judgment for attorney 
R. VoL 4, p. 876-878. This issue was also addressed in the first appeal, but the determination was 
made to include this order in the Notice of Appeal to avoid any claim of waiver. 
On October 31,2012, Dr. Reed filed his Appellant's Brief in the second appeal. R. Vol. 5, p. 1114-
APPELLAl"fT'S BRIEF 9 
1146. November 29, 2012, Ms. Reed's 
brief the second appeal was filed on LJ .......... '.l1U' ... l 
stipulated to submit the appeals on the Briefs and it was (wrlpr~'rI 
p.ll 178. Dr. Reed's 
R. Vol. 5, p. 1179-1 The parties 
appeals would be decided on the 
Briefs. R. Vol. 5, p. 1208-1212. On April 5, 2013, aMEMORAi~TIlJJ\tf OPOOON signed by Judge Griffm 
was filed. R. Vol. 5, p. 1213-1222. This Opinion decided raised in both appeals filed by 
Dr. Reed. Parts of his decision will be addressed in the argument portion of brief. The copy of his 
MEMORANDUM OPOOON in the Clerk's Record was missing page 7. On December 6, 2013, the Idaho 
Supreme Court entered an order granting Dr. Reed's Motion to 
Griffin's MEMORANDu'M OPThi10N. 
include a complete copy of Judge 
In his J\tffiMORAi'IDUM OPIN10N, Judge Griffm denied Ms. Reed's request for an award of 
attorney fees on appeal. R. Vol. 5. p. 1219. On April 29, 2013, a order signed by Judge Griffm was 
entered denying Ms. Reed her attorney fees on appeal. R. Vol. 5, p. 1223. On May 8, 2013, a NOTICE OF 
APPEAL to the Idaho Supreme Court was filed by Dr. Reed. R. 5, p. 1225-1236. On May 22,2013, 
a NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL was filed by Ms. Reed. R. Vol 5, p. 1237-1240, to seek review of Judge 
decision to deny her request for attorney fees on appeal. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
Although issues be 
concern Court's determination value 
Ms. Reed against Dr. 
costs. 
The trial took place on January 13 and 
decision. 
main to be addressed in this appeal 
property ~Ui,~rrlf'f1 to Dr. the of an offsetting 
in amount $198,642.00, decision to award 
the award 
2011. On January 28, 2011, the Court orally announced 
On page at L. 11-15 TRAl'JSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, and after Judge 
BRIEF 10 
valued, divided and awarded all of the parties' property on the previous pages of the tr,n,c",,·i,..,t 
value property awarded to Dr. Reed was $1,037,175.00. found 
awarded to Dr. Reed were amount of$210,129.00. He found that the net award to Dr. Reed was in 
the amount $827,046.00. This discussion is also located at R. Vol. 1, p. 176, L. 4-15. 
On page at L. 16-20 ofthe TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, Judge Wayman found 
the value of the property awarded to Ms. Reed was $667,524.00. He found that she should pay debts 
in the amount of$238,061.00. He stated that the net award to her was in the amount of$429,063.00. Judge 
Wayman stated at p. 70, L. 6-9 of the TRA..NSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing that in order to 
equalize the distribution of property and debts, a judgment in favor of Ms. Reed and against Dr. Reed should 
entered in the amountof$198,642.00. This discussion is also located at R. Vol 1, p. 176, L. 16-25, p. 177, 
L. 1-16. 
Over half of the value of the assets awarded to Dr. Reed consisted of700 shares of stock in Mountain 
Inc.. These 700 shares were found by Judge Wayman to represent a 22.97 percent interest in 
total ownership ofthis corporation. TRAl'JSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 45, L. 17-23. This 
can also be found at R. Vol. 1, p. 152, L. 17-23. Judge Wayman assigned these shares to Dr. Reed at a value 
of $642,045.00. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 63, L. 19-21. This can also be found at 
Vol 1, p. 170, L. 1. 
assets were upon 
VUJlH..,U",was situated. announcing his decision value of Mountain 
testimony of of the real property 
was 
Hearing, p. 49, L. 15-19. (Also located at R. Vol 1, p. 156, L 15-19.). Judge Wayman further stated that 
testimony of Stan Moe with respect to the value of the building owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., 
as of the date divorce was the most credible. TRANSClLTPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 52, 
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L. 1-5. (Also located at R. VoL 1, p. 159, L. 1-5). 
Mr. Moe's Appraisal was "'''AHHC,,",,", as '--"'-'HUH 57. In addition to 
included as an exhibit on appeal, a copy of and Report can be at pages 49-99 
Clerk's Supplemental Record dated November 15,20 3. following page numbers will be the Clerk's 
page numbers on the bottom of this Clerk's Supplemental Record. 
The date of this report was February 4,2009, and the report was addressed to Midwest Business 
Capital. (p.49). The date of the valuation and was stated to be January 26,2009 (p.52) which 
was almost two years before the trial before Judge Wayman which took place on January 13 and 14,2011. 
According to this letter and as of January 26, 2009, the '-",-'':>LU'ts was found to be 16,686 
square feet. (bottom of page 49). It was contemplated that an additional 7,595 feet would be added (top 
of page 49). 4,720 square feet ofthe main floor of the proposed new addition was to be leased to Kellogg 
Physical Therapy (bottom of page 49) and the remaining 2,875 square feet was to be used for storage 
(bottom of page 49). The market value of the existing as of January 26, 2009, was stated to be 
$3,476,000.00 in the appraisal (top half of page 50). The appraisal further stated that the estimated market 
value of the building, when the additional square had been added to the existing building on the 
estimated completion date of September 30, 2009, would be $4,818,000.00. (Top half of page 50). The 
appraisal finally stated that the "Market 
$4,850,000.00. (Top half of page 
(p. 57). 
new 
At Occupancy" was determined to be 
had not started as date oftlle valuation .. 
During trial, Mr Moe stated that the appraisal was done for a and this was the intended 
use. He further stated that he didn't do an appraisal for the case and not do an appraisal for either of the 
parties to the action. TRlAL TRA1\[SCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 21, L 8-20. He stated that he had been retained by 
Ms. Reed to conduct a review of another appraisal which was done by Thomas Godbold. TRIAL 
TR.A.J'\fSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 22, L 1-22. Mr. Godbold's appraisal, which was dated August 19,2010, was 
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adnllttt~d as Plaintiff's Exhibit 58. 
At h"l1'Atn of page 52 Moe's 2009, appraisal 
"Based upon the data and analysis presented report, we present our value conclusions 
subject property. Placing greater reliance on the Sales and Income Approach, we conclude the Fee Simple 
Estate, assuming all construction to be complete and occupancy stabilized at 95% is $4,850,000.00". 
At the time the appraisal was done, work had not even started on the addition. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
57,page numbered 4). At TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: VoL I, p. 59, 1. 1-5, Mr. Moe stated that he did not recall 
if "we" had been called back to verify that the work had been done. He stated that he had not gone through 
the building after the addition was completed, although he had observed it when he was driving past. 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 59,1. 6-9. 
According to Mr. Godbold's appraisal admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 58, and at page 6, the square 
footage of the main floor of the addition was found to be 4,488 square feet and not 4,720 square feet as was 
contemplated the February, 2009, appraisal by Mr. Moe. According to Mr. Godbold's appraisal, the 
second floor of the addition was 2,725 square feet and not 2,875 square feet as was contemplated in Mr. 
Moe's February, 2009, appraisal. As built, the addition was 382 square feet less than the addition 
contemplated in Mr. Moe's February, 2009 appraisal. (7,595 s.fvs. 7,213 s.£), 
Mr. Moe reviewed ]Vir. Godbold's report and prepared another report was admitted as 
62. He 
sa.rne 
Godbold's ,",v"'-'''''' 
on page 2 
used by Mr. 
as 
was 7,213 square 
Mr. Moe did not challenge Mr. 
382 square less than in Mr. 
Paula Olson stated that she was the clinic manager for 11./1".11"..,1-.,," Health Services, P.c.. 
TRANSCRIPT: VoL I, p. 133,1. 13-20. She stated addition was completed in April of 20 1 0, and 
that a certificate of occupancy was issued at TRIAL I, p. 139,1. 13-25, p. 
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140, L 1. She stated that there had 
and that the change resulted in less square too'tag;e. 
stated that the building had to be moved back three to 
TRAJ.~SCRIPT: VoL I, p. 141, L 1-9. 
design addition during construction phase 
TR.Au"TSCRIPT: Vol I, p. L15- 22. She 
so it would not go over a sewer line. TRIAL 
On page numbered 38 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 57, :NIr. Moe calculated the value of the addition to be 
$1,400,000.00. When this amount is divided the anticipated square footage of7,585, the result is $184.57 
per square foot. The addition, as built, was 382 square feet less than the building which was contemplated 
in his appraisal. When the missing 382 square feet is multiplied by the cost per square foot of$184.57, the 
result is $70,505.70 and this should have been r"c'Yrurprl in to reduce the value of the building. This would 
have reduced the value of the Mountain Health Care, Inc., stock. 
When asked ifhe was able to state that real propert'j was worth 4.8 million as of the date of his 
testimony (January 13,2011), Mr. Moe stated that he was unable to do so, TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I. 
p. 63, L 13-15. He stated that he was unaware that top floor of the addition was an empty shell. TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPT: VoL I, p. 63, L 23-15, p. 64, L. 1-2. Not surprisingly, Judge Wayman stated that "The fair 
market value of the building, which is really the market value of Mountain Health Care, Incorporated, 
it is a difficult question to answer in this case, because we-what we did not have was an expert opinion as 
to what the fair market value of that building asset was as of the date of the parties' divorce. None 
of the came in and said that. In fact, both Mr. Godbold and Mr. Moe specifically avoided saying that. 
were not in a position to give that opinion." TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 46, L. 
21-25, p. 47, L. 1-5. 
Mr. Carlson testified with respect to the value of the assets and the amount of debt owed by 
Mountain Health Care, Inc. During his testimony, Mr. Carlson made it clear that the numbers he was using 
came from other sources. With respect to the value ofthe real property, he stated that he was not qualified 
to value the real property, but used the appraisals from others. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 184, L. 2-
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22. He stated that he had relied on appraisal by Thomas Godbold for the value the real property. 
TRAt'JSCRIPT: VoL I, p. 185, L. 6-13. He stated that the information with respect to the value 
items owned by Mountain Health Care, and liabilities came from Mountain Inc.'s 
December 31,2009, financial statements. TRIAL TRAt'JSCRIPT: VoL I, p. 185, L. 15-25. 
In arriving at the net value of Mountain Health Care, Inc., Judge Wayman had to consider the debts 
of this business. Judge Wayman based his findings as to the amount ofthe indebtedness on Mr. Carlson's 
testimony and determined that Mountain Health Care, Inc., owed $2,439,739.00. TRANSCRIPT: Court's 
Oral Decision Hearing, p. 52, L. 6-13. :;Vir. Carlson's opinion as to the amount of the debt owed by 
Mountain Health Care, Inc. was based on the information given to him by Mountain Health Care, Inc. and 
the information set forth on page 2 of Defendant's Exhibit G 1. For the Court's convenience, a copy of this 
Exhibit is attached. 
The debt amount of$2,439,739.00 ,used by Judge Wayman, is identical to the debt amount shown 
on the second page of Defendant's Exhibit G-l and must have been the source of both Mr. Carlson's and 
Judge Wayman's finding concerning the debt amount. Of this total, the long term debt was stated to be 
$2,383,252.00. This would have been as of the end of December, 2009, and a little over a year before the 
trial in January of 2011. As of the date of trial, the actual debt amount on the building alone had been 
increased to "2.8 million" according to the testimony of Paula Olson. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 1 
L. 14-21. 
In the last sentence of the second paragraph of the first page of Defendant's Exhibit G 1, Mr. Carlson 
stated that "The value of the Company's other assets and liabilities reported as of December 31,2009 have 
been estimated and represent a relatively insignificant part of the overall value." The second page of this 
Exhibit sets forth the assets and liabilities of Mountain Health Care, Inc., as of December 31, 2009. The 
amount of the indebtedness owed as of December 31,2009 was in the amount of$2,439,739.00. This is the 
exact debt amount used by Judge Wayman to arrive at the net value of Mountain Health Care, Inc .. 
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TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 52, L. 6-13. This figure, however, was over a year old as 
date of the trial. There was no tes:tl.1flon) that as this was the amount still owed 
Mountain Health Care, Inc. testimony Ms. Olsen at trial ".n'~UUJH"';"" that Mountain Health 
owed at least $400,000.00 more as of the date of trial on just the building debt alone than was owed as ofthe 
end of2009. 
The long term debt shown on second page of Defendant' s Exhibit G 1 for the building was stated 
to be in the amount of$2,383,252.00 as of December 31, 2009. During the first day of trial on January 13, 
2011, Paula Olson stated that the building loan balance was "2.8 million". TRV\L TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, 
p. 158, L. 14-21. debt would not the two other debts listed on the second page of Defendant's 
Exhibit G1 which totaled a little over $58,000.00. Judge Wayman's fmding as to the amount of the 
indebtedness owed by Mountain Health Care, Inc., as of January 13,2011, was offby at least $400,000.00 
and up to $458,000.00 if the other two debts owed as of the end of2009 were still owed as of January 13, 
2011. By failing to use current debt mt~Jrnlat]lOn for Mountain Health Care, Inc, Judge Wayman ended up 
finding that Mountain Health Care, was worth at least $400,000.00 more than what it was actually 
worth. 
and 
U sing the appraisal done by 
adding in other assets 
Mountain 
Defendant's Exhibit G 1. 
Godbold" which valued the land and building at $2,500,000.00, 
on 
numbers on G 1 
Care, Mr. Carlson came up with a gross value of 
"".Ilrn,,, trn~l"'rr1" the bottom of page 2 
comprised the total have been circled. The other 
assets 
$131,227.00 and "Total 
included "Net 
mpment" valued at $243,669.00. 
<'u"~HJ'" Assets" at 
VI/hen Mr. Carlson was being asked to use Mr. Moe's valuation of the building and land instead 
Mr. Godbold's values" Ms. Reed's attorney stated that amount to be used was "4.86 million" 
TRAl~SCRIPT: Vol I, p. 186, L. 10-20) which was $10,000.00 more than Mr. Moe's actual value of 
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$4,850,000.00 as was stated in his report admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 57 (Clerk's Amended Record dated 
November 2013 at page 50). When increased amount of"4.86 million" was used by Mr. Carlson and 
added to the assets from Defendant's '-''''''UUH Gl, he came up with $5,234,866.00. TRlAL 
TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 187, L.1-2. amount was the total gross amount Judge Wayman started with 
to arrive at the net value of Dr. Reed's interest in Mountain Health Care, Inc .. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral 
Decision Hearing, p. 52, L. 6-12. This figure would have been arrived at by adding the claimed value of the 
building and real property of$4,860,000.00, (instead of$4,850,000.00) with the amount for the net tangible 
assets and equipment circled on the second page of the attached copy of Defendant's G l. 
According to the second page of Defendant' s Exhibit G 1, the non-real property assets of Mountain 
Health Care, Inc., as of the end of2009, consisted of$131,227.00 for cash, cash equivalents and accounts 
receivable and $243,659.00 for equipment. These items are circled on page 2 of the attached copy of 
Defendant's Exhibit G 1. There was no testimony which established that over a year later and on January l3, 
2011, Mountain Health Care, Inc., still held cash, cash equivalents and accounts receivable in the amount 
of$131,227.00. There was no testimony which established that over a year later and on January l3, 2011, 
Mountain Health Care, Inc., still had equipment worth $243,659.00. 
When Paula Olson testified on January 13, 2011, she stated that Mountain Health Care, Inc., owned 
an x-ray machine which she valued at $50,000.00. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 156, L. 9-17. In 
response to questioning by Ms. Reed's attorney, she agreed that the 
Care, Inc., were the building, the land and the x-ray machine. TRIAL 
23. 
assets held by Mountain Health 
Vol.I,p. 156,L. 18-
In announcing his decision concerning the value of the real and personal property of Mountain 
Health Care, Inc., Judge Wayman relied, part, on Plaintiffs Exhibit 63. Exhibit was a four page 
statement from Zurich Insura.'lce surrlmarized the items covered under the policy and the amounts 
which would be paid in the event of loss. Judge Wayman stated that this statement from the insurance 
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company represented Mountain Health 
Oral Decision Hearing, p. 49, L. 20-25. 
Inc. '$ value of it's real and persona! property. TRA1~SCRIPT: 
on this insurance statement, Wayman stated that the 
value contents building was $387,000.00. TRANSCRIPT: p. 
50, L. 1-3. This exhibit showed that the personal property was insured for $387,000.00, but the level of 
coverages stated on Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 was replacement cost, not fair market value. 
In discussing Plaintiff's Exhibit 63, Paula Olson stated twice that the contents of the building (as 
opposed to the personal property of Mountain Health Care, Inc.) were valued at $387,000.00. TRiAL 
TRANSCRIPT Vol. I, p. 150, L. 6-18. The contents of the building would have also included the assets of 
Mountain Health Services, P.e. The estimated book value of the office equipment of this professional 
corporation was stated to be $151,610.00 on Schedule 5 of Defendant's Exhibit G. The only competent 
evidence concerning the value of the personal property owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., as of the date 
of trial in January of2011 was Paula Olson's testimony. She stated that Mountain Health Care, Inc., owned 
x-ray equipment worth $50,000.00 and that it did not own any other assets besides the land and the building. 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 156, L. 6-23. 
Because the evidence did not establish that Mountain Health Care, Inc., had personal property assets 
worth $374,886.00 as of the of trial, this figure should not have been used in arriving at the gross value 
of Mountain Health Care, Inc .. The figure of$50,000.00 should have been used instead as this was the value 
of the x-ray machine according to Paula Olson and she also stated that other than the land and building, this 
was the only asset of Mountain Health Care, L'1c., Because the existence of another $324,886.00 in assets 
as of the date of trial was not established by the testimony, Judge Wayman overvalued Mountain Health 
Care, Inc., by at least $324,886.00 with respect to just the personal property assets alone. 
The parties owned a 113 interest in real property located in Pinehurst, Idaho. This property was 
listed as Item number 13 on the Inventory of Property which was used as an aid at trial. Judge Wayman 
awarded this 113 interest to Dr. Reed at a value of $15,200.00. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
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Hearing, p. 63, L. 14. The competent evidence introduced at trial did not support a above $10,000.00 
as will be discussed in the ~'M"u<".n portion of this Brief. 
Ms. Reed stated went back to work several months after she had "P11i;:'lr!>,t",; Dr. Reed. 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: VoL II, P. 290, L. 14-24. Ms. Reed was deposed on September 13,2010, and a 
copy of her deposition was admitted as Court's Exhibit 4. TRIAL TRAl"J"SCRIPT, VoL II, p. 374-375. At 
the time of her deposition, she was working three nights a week. Court's Exhibit 4, p. 64, L. 6-13. She stated 
that her employment had changed from fun time to something else at her own request. TRIAL 
TRAl"J"SCRIPT: VoL II, p. 292, L. 20-25, p. 293, L. 1-4. As of the date of the trial, she stated she was 
working an average of24 hours per week. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Vol. p. 294, L. 21-25. 
During her testimony, Plaintiffs Exhibit 43 was admitted. TRiAL TRANSCRIPT: VoL II, p. 293, 
L. 7-23. This Exhibit stated that Ms. Reed was working 24 hours a week. She calculated her weekly gross 
income at $789.28 per week and her yearly gross income at $41,042.56 per year. Plaintiff's Exhibit 44 was 
also admitted at the same time as Plaintiff s Exhibit 43. Plaintiff s Exhibit 44 was Ms. Reed's work schedule 
and it reflected that she worked Friday, Saturday, Sunday and Monday every 
average out to two 12 hour shifts a week. 
week. would 
Even though the evidence was uncontradicted that Ms. Reed averaged 24 hours a week, Judge 
Wayman stated that she was only working 24 hours every two weeks. TRANSCRIPT: ~:.!:!!.l~~~~~~ 
=~=, p. 32, L. 1-8. He found that she was making $789.00 every two weeks, but this was Ms. Reed's 
average gross earnings for 24 hours each week. He found that Ms. Reed's yearly income was $20,514.00 
per year (TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 32, L. 12-15) when Ms. Reed had correctly 
calculated her income for working 24 hours a week to be $41,042.56 per year in Plaintiff's Exhibit 43. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I 
IN THE V ALUA TION ANTI AWARD OF THE OF 
STOCK IN MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIR.\1JNG HIS 
VALUATION AND AWARD. 
II 
WAS J1JDGE WAYMAN'S DECISION TO V ALlJE THE COMMERCIAL LOT IN PINEHlJRST 
AT $15,200.00 BASED ON SUBSTAl~TIAL Al~ COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND DID JUDGE 
GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRt\HNG JUTIGE WAYMAN 
ill 
DID JlJ"DGE W A ThlAN CORRECTLY CALCULATE MS. REED'S INCOME FOR PURPOSES 
OF SETTING A CHILD SLJ'PPORT A Wl\RD 
IV 
WAS IT ERROR FOR MS. TO BE A WARDED A PORTION OF HER ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS 
V 
WAS IT ERROR WAYMAN TO ORDER THE TWO CORPORATIONS TO ISSUE 
THE STOCK TO THE SHERlFF 
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ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF 
standard respect to a district court's decision on magistrate's 
division is addressed by the statements made in Brinkmeyerv. Brinkmeyer, 135 586,21 P. 3d 918 
(2001). The Supreme Court is to review the decision of the magistrate independently, but with due regard, 
for the decision of the district court. Issues oflaw are subject to a free review standard. The magistrate's 
findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal, even if the evidence is conflicting, if the factual findings 
are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
I 
DID JUDGE WAYMAi'f ERR IN THE VALUATION AND AWARD OF SHARES OF 
STOCK IN MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., AND DID JUDGE GRIFFIN 
VALUATION AND AWARD. 
Judge Wayman valued the 700 shares of stock held Mountain 
IN i\FFIRMING HIS 
Care, Inc.,at $642,045.00. 
TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 53, L. 11-12. He awarded an shares of stock to Dr. 
Reed. TRAl'\fSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 63, L. 19-21. When determined value 
of these shares of stock was added to the rest of the community property "","Tripe! to Dr. Reed, the 
distribution was unequal and Judge Wayman pn1"",,.,,-.-I ajudgment against Dr. Reed 
in the amount of $ to 
p. 70, L. 6-8. 
In Simplot v. 96 239, 526 P. 2d 844 (l Idaho that 
where stock shares are not divided between the parties to a divorce proceeding, but are assigned to one party, 
an offsetting amount of other assets going to the other party, it is essential the trial court make an 
accurate determination market value stock. In Simp/ot, Idaho Supreme Court also stated that 
in valuing stock, the Court should determine the fair market value as distinguished from the book value. The 
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Idaho Supreme Court defmed the "book value" of assets as the historical cost of an asset, adjusted for 
depreciation. (At page 245 Idaho). 
Asa rule, community property is to be valued as date McAffee v. McAffee 
132 Idaho 281, 289, 971 P. 2d 734 (Ct. App. 1999). This would include shares of stock. Josepbson v. 
Josepbson, 115 Idaho 1142, 1150, 772 P. 2d 1236 (Ct. App. 1989). Because Judge Wayman ordered the 
marriage dissolved at the end of the second day of trial on January 14,2011, (TRIAL TRAt'-rSCRIPT, Vol. 
II, p. 439, L. 6-25) the date of the divorce was January 14,2011. 
long term debt shown on the second page of Defendant' s Exhibit G 1 for the building was stated 
to be in the amount of$2,383,252.00 as of December 31,2009. Over a year later and on the first day of trial 
on January 13,2011, Paula Olson stated that the amount owing on the building alone was "2.8 million". 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: VoL I, p. 158, L. 14-21. This debt would not include the two other debts listed on 
the second page of Defendant' s Exhibit G 1, which totaled a little over $58,000.00, assuming that they were 
still owing as of the marital dissolution date of January 14, 2011. 
Based on Mr. Carlson's testimony, which was based on Defendant's Exhibit G-l, Judge Wayman 
found that Mountain health Care Inc, owed $2,479,739.00. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, 
p. 52, L. 10-13. finding as to the amount of the indebtedness owed by Mountain Health Care, Inc., as 
of January 2011, was low by at least $400,000.00 for just the building alone and up to $458,000.00 
other two as of2009 were as ofJanuary 14, 2011. By to use current 
mt,ornClatlon for Mountain Health Care, Inc, Judge Wayman ended up fmding that Mountain Health 
Inc., was approxlm"ltei~ $400,000.00 more 
~v1r. Godbold's finding the addition to 
what it was actually worth. 
building was 382 square less the addition 
contemplated Mr. Moe's appraisal was not contradicted and was somewhat supported by the testimony 
of Ms. Olson. She testified that there had been an architectural change in the design addition during 
the construction phase which had resulted in less square footage. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VoL I, p. 140, 
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L. 11-22. At $184.57 per square foot, this decrease in the square footage could have decreased the value 
of the addition by $70,505.70 as is discussed in the STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. In review of Mr. 
Godbold's appraisal, Mr. Moe used the same square footage for the addition as did Mr. Godbold so, 
presumably, Mr. Godbold's opinion that the building addition contained less square footage than was set 
forth in the appraisal of the as yet unbuilt addition (Plaintiff's Exhibit was not disputed by Mr. Moe. 
The uncontradicted evidence at trial from Ms. Olson was that the only property that Mountain Health 
Care, Inc., had other than the building and land, was an x-ray machine worth $50,000.00. The evidence did 
not establish that as of January 13 and 14,2011, Mountain Health Care, still owned $243,659.00 in 
equipment (from page 2 of Defendant' s Exhibit G 1 ), nor did it establish that Mountain Health Care, L'1c., still 
had $131,227.00 worth of cash, cash equivalents and accounts receivable as it did on December 31,2009, 
and as reported on page 2 of Defendant's Exhibit G l. 
Mr. Godbold's appraisal was admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 58. On page 17 of this report, he stated 
that he felt the value of the real property and building was $2,500,000.00 as of July 28,2010. On the bottom 
of page 49 and the top of page 50 of the TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, Judge Wayman 
stated that Plaintiff s Exhibit 63 (the insurance form discussed above) represented an opinion from the 
owners valuing the building at $3,750,000.00. He said that this statement from the owners directly 
impeached Mr. Goldbold's opinion that the real property owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc. was worth 
$2,500,000.00. He concluded stating that he was not going to give Mr. Godbold's opinion any weight. 
The third page of Plaintiff s Exhibit 63 shows that the corporation elected to purchase replacement 
cost insurance for the building and the building contents. This is different than purchasing insurance 
coverages to pay for the fair market value of the building or any personal property that might be destroyed 
in the future. In State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687,693,169 P. 3d 275 (Ct. App. 2007), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals distinguished between market value, which was the reasonable price an owner would hold goods 
out for sale to the general public, and cost of replacement, which was stated to be the cost for the owner to 
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reacquire the same goods. In Carter-Holmes v. Sousa, 136 Or. App. 495, 901 P. 2d 932 (1995), the Court 
Appeals of Oregon stated that under "cost of replacement", insurer was obligated to pay the actual 
amount expended to repair or replace insured property as opposed to the actual cash value of the property 
destroyed. 
L'1 the context of a divorce proceeding, the Court is to determine the fair market value of community 
property as of the date of the divorce, not the replacement cost. Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 did not impeach Mr. 
Godbold's opinion because he was stating his opinion as to the fair market value of the land and building 
owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., not his opinion as to the replacement cost of the building. 
In .Jensen v . .Jensen, 128 Idaho 600,917 P. 2d 757 (1996), at page 606, Idaho, the Idaho Court 
Appeals found that the magistrate had misinterpreted an Exhibit and based on this misinterpretation, had 
concluded that the Exhibit was unreliable. The Idaho Court of Appeals found that this misinterpretation had 
colored the magistrate's view of the entire Exhibit. Similarly, Judge Wayman's misinterpretation of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63, which resulted in his conclusion that it set forth Mountain Health Care, Inc. 's opinion 
as to the fair market value of it's assets, colored his opinion as to the weight to be given to Mr. Godbold's 
testimony. Had this mistake not have been made, it is more likely that .Mr. Godbold's opinion as to the value 
of the building would have carried more weight and this may have changed Judge Wayman's determination 
as to value of the building and land owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc. 
Dr. Reed's 700 shares represented a minority interest in Mountain Health Care, Inc. This corporation 
was a closely held corporation. Judge Wayman did not discount the shares either because of the lack of a 
readily defined market for the shares or because the shares represented a minority interest in the corporation. 
The undersigned has been unable to locate an Idaho appellate case which discusses these discounts. In 
Josephson, at page 1149, Idaho, however, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated that the minority stock interests 
Ms. Josephson had been awarded by the trial court in two corporations were essentially valueless until the 
corporation could be liquidated because there was no ready market for the shares and she had no opportunity 
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for control. Similarly, there was and is no ready market for the shares awarded to Dr. Reed and the number 
shares held by him would not give him control of Mountain Health Care, 
InINRE MARRIAGE OF 200 App. 2008), at page 1087, the 
Colorado Court of Appeals found that in the context of marital dissolution proceedings, a marketability 
discount should be applied in valuing the shares in a closely held corporation. The Colorado Court of 
Appeals noted that in other cases, marketability discounts of 1 0% to 35% had been approved. In MATTER 
OF M..t\RRIAGE OF TOFTE, 134 Or. App. 449, 895 P. 2d 1387 (Or. App. 1995) the Court of Appeals of 
Oregon affIrmed a 35% marketability discount and stated as part it's rationale at page 1392 Pacific that 
"Because a readily defmed market for the shares of a closely held corporation generally does not exist, those 
shares are usually worth less than shares of a publicly traded corporation." In Tofte, both parties had caned 
experts to testifY about the amount of the discount. 
No expert was called concerning the amount of the discount which should be applied to Mountain 
Health Care, Inc., stock. As to Dr. Reed's 20% in LH'-"UInULU Health Services, P.C., however, Mr. Phelps 
testified that there should be a 20% minority interest discount, a 30% discount for lack of marketability and 
a total combined discount of 44%. TRIAL TRAl'\fSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 122-123. The same owners were 
involved in both Mountain Health Care, Inc. and Mountain Health Services, P.C. and the percentages owned 
by Dr. Reed in both corporations were similar. 
Judge stock be set aside because 
determination as to the value of the stock was not accurate. substantial value of these shares required 
the Reed UOjgmem should also be set aside. 
Dr. had before Court that Magistrate 
be directed to take additional evidence on the value the stock if the decision to award the stock to Dr. 
was affirmed. Alternatively, he requested that stock be ordered sold. In October of20 12, however, 
Ms. Reed purchased the 700 shares of stock Judge Wayman valued at $642,045.00 for $1.00 at an execution 
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sale. R. Vol. 5, p. 1106. These shares were subject to a buy-sell agreement which prohibited their sale to 
outsiders and required that they be sold back to Mountain Health Care, Inc.. A copy of this buy-sen 
agreement was attached to the AFFIDAVIT OF FREDERICK HALLER M.D. IN SIJPPORT 
G~l(j'\lISHEE'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE CASHEQUIV ALENT FOR SHARES OF STOCK SUBJECT 
TO GARNISHMENTwhkh was filed on April 19, 2012. R. Vol. 3, p. 669-704. In his affidavit, Dr. HaUer 
stated that the corporation was entitled to purchase the shares under the terms of the buy-sell agreement for 
$143,183.60. R. Vol. 3, p. 671. 
In both Josephson and Simp/ot, the appellate courts stated that the trial court was authorized to take 
additional evidence as to the value of the stock on remand if so desired. The disposition of community 
property is also subject to revision on appeal. I.C.32-714. With respect to shares of stock, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has also stated that the distribution of stock in a divorce decree does not become final until 
appeal is heard and finally disposed of. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 71 Idaho 468, 474, 233 P. 2d 1030 (1951). 
equalizing judgment against Dr. Reed should be reversed. When Ms. Reed executed on this 
judgment, she received $15,000.00 from Dr. Haller when the Mountain Health Services, P. C., stock was sold. 
R. Vol. 5, p. 1109. Where a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity, and the effect is as if it had never 
been entered. State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 359, 361, 941 P. 2d 330 (Ct. App. 1997). It has been stated 
that where a judgment creditor has received funds based on a judgment which is set aside, the judgment 
must LH'-'UV'Hto Radermacher v, 63 
531,538-539,123 P. 2d 426 (1942). Ms. Reed should be ordered to pay amount to Dr. plus 
from October 23, 12. case should be remanded back to the 1>1"'.",,''''<1 court 
V''''_'''Ul.Hl-;::> to address the rwp·cp"t status of the In Health to 
value of the shares, to reconsider the award of the shares themselves and to hear evidence on such matters 
as may be necessary to make an equitable award the shares. To the extent that it may be necessary 
another equalizing judgment to be entered, installment payments would be authorized under the Josephson 
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case cited above (at pages 1150 and 1151 Idaho). holding in Simp/ot would also not prohibit Judge 
Wayman from ordering that the shares of stock be instead of holding a furt.her hearing on the share value 
and this option should be left open for 
n 
WAS JUDGE WA YMAc~'S DECISION TO V ALlJE THE COMMERCLAL LOT IN PINEHURST 
AT $15,200.00 BASED ON SIJBSTAc'JTIAL Ac'iD COrvfPETENT EVIDENCE AND DID JUDGE 
GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRMING JUDGE W A ThlAN 
Judge Wayman awarded the commercial m to the Dr. Reed at a value of$15,200.00. 
Transcript: Court's Oral Decision Hearing. p. L.14-16. The value of$15,200.00 was not established by 
the testimony of Ms. Reed or by any witness called on The only testimony by Ms. Reed with 
respect to this commercial lot is located at TRIAL TRA~SCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 237, L. 1-20. In her testimony, 
she stated that this real property was also owned by her mother-in-law and one other couple. She stated that 
the property value had gone down significantly since the purchase. She stated that the value had been arrived 
at by dividing the amount in the tax notice by 3. A copy tax notice was provided as part of the pretrial 
compliance to Dr. Reed's former attorney and was marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 8. The TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPT does not reflect that this exhibit was offered or admitted. Ms. Reed did not state her 
opinion with respect to the fair market value of this 1/3rd lnT,~"p'OT m lot as of the date of the triaL 
Dr. Reed's testimony concerning this lot is located TRIAL TRfu~SCRIPT, Vol. n, p. 321, L. 9-
25, and the testimony was as follows: 
"A. And ifI had to put a value on it, I would accept that piece of property at 10,000. I-if 
the Court were to say, well, the value's $10,000 and we can award it to Reed, I would be pleased 
with that. To me that's what it's worth. 
Q. Okay. 
MISS GRAHANI: We'll stipulate to that, Judge. 
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THE COURT: Stipulate to what? 
MISS GRAHAM: $10,000 to Dr. Reed. We didn't know what the value was." 
Ms. Reed, through Ms. Graham, admitted that lot was worth $10,000.00 and should 
to Reed at that value. This admission was accepted by Dr. Reed. An admission made by an attorney at 
is binding on his or her client as a solemn admission. McClean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 
783,430 P. 2d 670 (1967). 
At the hearing on the motion to reconsider, Judge Wayman stated that the evidence concerning the 
value of the lot was contained in The Inventory which was admitted at trial. TRANSCRIPT: January 23, 
2012, Motions Hearing, p. 27, L. 1-6. The undersigned has been unable to locate any place hl the record 
which proves that Court's Exhibit 1 was admitted. On page 4 of 5 of the index located in TRIAL 
TRA.~'JBCRIPT, Vol. 1, Court's Exhibit 1 is identified, but the index does not show that it was admitted as 
it does with respect to other exhibits admitted at triaL The only place Court's Exhibit 1 was discussed during 
trial is located at TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Vol. I, p. 2 wherein Ms. Reed's attorney states that she is 
providing an extra copy of Court's Exhibit 1 to Judge Wayman. 
In her Respondent's Reply to Appellant's Brief on Appeal at R. Vol. 4, p. 848, Ms. Reed contended 
" The burden of proof is upon the Appellant to prove value. He testified about the value and 
submission by stipulation the Property List. See Court's Exhibit 1 admitted by stipUlation. 
Vol. 2, p. L. 7-12)." Dr. did not stipulate to aU'H'~"H'-'1' of Court's Exhibit 
1 at any during the triaL He agreed that value of the lot was $10,000.00 and could be awarded to 
at value. p. 321, L 9-25. Ms. Reed's attorney agreed 
At TRLAL TRANSCRIPT, p. 290 -.297, Ms. Reed was being asked questions by Dr. 
attorney concerning income and work schedule. At page 293, her attorney offered to 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,2,40,41,42,43,44 and Defendant's L. They were an admitted. These exhibits 
pertained to Ms. Reed's work schedule, changes in her work schedule and the compensation she received. 
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None of these exhibits related to the value and distribution of the parties' property. Court's Exhibit 1 was 
neither offered nor admitted during this part of the trial nor during any other part of the trial to the best of 
the undersigned's knowledge. 
A complete copy of Judge Griffin's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal was attached to Dr. Reed's 
Motion to Augment dated November 26,2013, On Lhe bottom of page 8 of his Memorandum Opinion, 
Judge Griffm affirmed Judge Wayman, with the exception of the QDRO distribution date, and concluded 
as to the other issues that "The Magistrate reached his decision on all other issues through reason and acted 
within the bounds of his discretion. There was substantial and competent evidence to support those fmdings 
and conclusions." Unfortunately, he did not state 
that Court's Exhibit 1 had been admitted. 
On page 3, in paragraph numbered 7 (b) of 
part of the record he had reviewed which established 
Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Dr. 
Reed requested that the Clerk's record include,"A copy of Court's Exhibit 1 (property List) together with 
any record showing that it was admitted during the proceeding before the magistrate court, if any." R. Vol. 
5, p. 1227. As prepared, the original 5 volumes 
Exhibit 1. 
On July 29,2013, an Order was entered 
Clerk's record did not contain a copy of Court's 
required the District Court Clerk to supplement the 
record on appeal with a copy of Court's Exhibit 1 and also required the District Court Clerk to include any 
notations on the document or not had admitted. A copy ofthis order 
is part of the Clerk's additional record dated September 9, 2013, and is located at pages 57-60 of this 
supplemental record. In response to this Order, the 
established that Court's Exhibit 1 had been admitted. 
Court Clerk did not produce any records which 
On September 23,2013, an Order Requiring Corrections and Additions to Clerk's Supplemental 
Record on Appeal was entered. A copy is located at pages 180-184 the Amended Clerk's record dated 
November 15, 2013. On the bottom of page 3 and the top of page 4 of this order, the Court Clerk was 
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ordered as follows: 
"A copy of Court's Exhibit 1 shan be included as part ofthe Clerk's record on appeal in addition to 
being sent to the Idaho Supreme Court as an exhibit. The copy shall include any markings on the document 
which reflects whether or not it was at admitted at the trial court level. The Clerk shall also make as part 
it's record any record which establishes that Court's Exhibit 1 was admitted during the proceedings in front 
of the magistrate if this cannot be ascertained from a review of Court's Exhibit 1." 
A copy of Court's Exhibit 1 is located at pages 36-41 of the Clerk's Amended record dated 
November 15,2013. There are no indications on Court's Exhibit 1 that it was admitted at triaL In response 
to the above order, the District Court Clerk did not produce any additional records which show that Court's 
Exhibit 1 was admitted by Judge Wayman. 
In Donnelingerv. Donnelinger, 107 Idaho 431, 690 P. 2d 366 (Ct. App. 1984) at page 439, th.e 
Idaho Court of Appeals held that pretrial submissions do not constitute evidence unless so provided in the 
pretrial order or stipulated by the parties. Neither of these exceptions existed. The only competent evidence 
of value of the Pinehurst commercial lot was the stipulation that it was worth $10,000.00. Judge Wayman 
erred in fmding that the value of$15 ,200. 00 was estab Ii shed by Court's Exhibit 1 because this document was 
not admitted. Where the trial court's findings are not based upon substantial and competent evidence, they 
must be set aside. Wood v. Sadler, 93 Idaho 552, 557, 406 P. 2d 42 (1970). The dollar amount of the total 
award to Dr. Reed should have been reduced by $5,200.00 with an appropriate reduction in the amount of 
equalizing judgment. 
ill 
DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRMING JUDGE W A YNIAN'S DECISION CONCERNING 
MS. GROSS INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF SETTING A CHILD AMOUNT 
Idaho Child Support Guidelines (ICSGs) are located at (c) (6). Section 6 of 
ICSGs states that if a parent is voluntarily underemployed, child support shall be based on gross potential 
income. In KornfieJd v. 134 Idaho 383, 3 P. 3d 61 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court's decision to impute income to a registered nurse where the trial court had found that 
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she was voluntarily unemployed. 
According to Ms. Reed, she had been working as an R.N. three shifts a week for a total of36 hours 
per week. TRIAL TRA..1\fSCRIPT, Vol. p. 1, L. She stated that her employment had changed from 
fun time to part time because of Dr. Reed's addiction. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, VoL II, p. 292, L. 21-25, p. 
293, L. 1-2. She stated that she had voluntarily reduced her work hours. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Vol. II, p. 
293, L. 25, p. 294, L. 1-10. At the time of trial, she stated that she was averaging 24 hours per week. TRL;\L 
TRANSCRIPT, Vol. II, p. 294, L 21-23. 
During her testimony, several exhibits concerning the hours she worked and her income were 
admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,2,40,41, 43,44, and Defendant's Exhibit L. TRIAL TRA.NSCRIPT, 
Vol. II, p. 293, L. 5-23. Plaintiff's Exhibit 43 established that for working 24 hours a week, her gross annual 
income would be $41,042.56. In Plaintiff's Ex.hibit 43, she calculated her gross income for working two 
shifts a week at $789.29 per week. This amount was multiplied by 52 weeks which resulted in a total of 
$41,042.56 on an annual basis. 
Judge Wayman stated when he announced his decision that, " ... But she could work full-time, she 
chooses not to. And that's her choice. But looking at the Guidelines, I think I have to impute a certain 
amount of wages to her as if she was working full-time." TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, 
p. 32, L. 16-18. After deciding that under Guidelines he had to impute wages to Ms. Reed as if she was 
working on a time basis, she was only 24 hours every two weeks. 
TRAt'JSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 32, L. 3-7. He then stated that her gross income per 
weekend that she was working was $789.00. 
multiplied this amount by 26 weeks and came up 
Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 32, L. 10-12. 
$20,514.00. TRA.NSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
~~= p. 32, L. 12-15. He imputed an additional $20,514.00 of income for purposes of computing the 
support amount and stated that her gross income for purposes of child support would be $41,028,00. 
TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 33, L 4-8. This, however, was the amount that she was 
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actually making for working an average of two twelve hour shifts a week. 
By imputing the earnings which would be generated by Ms. Reed if she worked an 
per week, or 36 hours per week as she had been working, her imputed income would be $61,542.00 per year 
instead of $41,028.00. Even Ms. Reed's attorney conceded that this was the amount Ms. Reed would earn 
annually if she was working on a full time basis. At TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing, p. 82, L 18-
21, Ms Graham stated that "If she was working fun-time it would be 61,542." This is the amount Judge 
Wayman should have used to compute the child support amount. 
On appeal to the District Court, in his Memorandum Decision, Judge GriffIn, affIrmed Judge 
Wayman with respectto the amount of child support but stated in his Memorandum Opinion that" .. In 
announcing his decision the Magistrate seemed to indicate that Stephanie, at the time of trial, was 
working 24 hours every two weeks instead of 24 hours per week. The Magistrate therefore doubled 
estimate of Stephanie's current income ($20,514.00 per year) to arrive at the final income figure of 
$41,028.00 per year. It appears from Exhibit #43 that Stephanie was, at the time of trial, actually "T"""?>,-"" 
every weekend and earning approximately $41,028.00 per year." (R. VoL 5, bottom of page 1217 and top 
of page 1218). He also stated, in part, that "The court considered a work schedule that permitted Stephanie 
to continue to meet responsibilities for caring for the parties' children during the week." R. Vol V, p. 1217. 
During Dr. Reed's testimony at trial, he stated that his oldest child was 14 and his youngest 
was 6. VoL p. 370, L. of the three children were, less 
6 months of age at the time of trial. 
The court is required to impute time ,,,,,"'vn,,, to a voluntarily underemployed parent 
IS carmg a child less than 6 months of age. I.R.C.P.6 Section Because none of 
parties' three children were less than 6 months of age, this exception was not applicable. The Court may 
depart from the Guidelines only if it that evidence establishes that the amount of child support 
required by the guidelines would be inappropriate and sets forth on the record the dollar amount that the 
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Guidelines would require and the circumstances justifYing a departure from Guidelines. I.R.C.P.6 (c) 
(6), Section 3. In his decision, Judge Wayman clearly stated he was going to impute income to Ms. Reed 
because she was voluntarily He not conclude, as Judge Griffin infers, that he could 
depart from the Guidelines because Ms. Reed had to continue to meet responsibilities for caring for the 
children. 
Judge Wayman's error was a math error. Judge Griffin found that Judge Wayman had erred 
mathematically, but affirmed Judge Wayman's decision on a basis that is not entirely clear. It appears that 
Judge Griffin felt that Judge Wayman could depart from the Guidelines because of the custody arrangement 
which required Ms. Reed to care the children. Judge Wayman, however, expressly stated that 
under the Guidelines he was required to impute income to Ms. Reed. Neither Judge Wayman nor Judge 
Griffin made any express findings as to the amount of imputed income for Ms. Reed and the amount of child 
support which would be required by 
3 of the Guidelines .. 
Guidelines based on her imputed income as is required by Section 
"The relevant inquiry in determining an abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court; (1) 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choices before it; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." Barrett v. 149 Idaho 21, 23, 232 P. 3d 799 (2010). 
If Judge Wayman 'HVVH'<V~ depart the Guidelines, abused his discretion when he failed 
to " .. set forth on the record the dollar amount of support that the Guidelines would require and set forth the 
circumstances justifYing the departure from the Guidelines .... " as was and is required by I.R.C.P.6 (c)(6) 
Section 3. When he announced his decision, however, he stated that " ... But she could work full-time, she 
chooses not to. And that's her choice. But looking at the Guidelines, I think I have to impute a certain 
amount of wages to her as if she was working full-time." TRANSCR1PT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, 
p. 32, L. 12-16. 
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working one more 12 hour shift a week for a total of36 hours a week, Ms. Reed's gross yearly 
income would be $61,542.00 year. This amount was stated to be correct by Ms. Reed's if Ms. 
Reed was working full time. This Court should that Judge Wayman should have used $61,542.00 as Ms. 
Reed's potential income for purposes of setting the child support amount. The matter should be remanded 
baCK for Judge Wayman to recalculate the correct child support amount using gross yearly amount and 
to also change the ratio concerning the amount each of the parties is to pay for uncovered expenses associated 
with the children. 
IV 
WAS IT ERROR FOR MS. REED TO BE A WARDED A PORTION OF HER ATTOMTEY 
AND COSTS 
A. MS. REED'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES ANTI COSTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DENIED BECAUSE SHE FAILED TO i'vlAKE A TIMELY A1\lD PROPER REQUEST FOR AN A WARD 
OF FEES AND COSTS: 
On January 28, 2011, Judge Wayman orally awarded Ms. Reed a judgment in the amount of 
$10,000.00 for a partial award of her attorney fees and costs. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
Hearing, p. 74, L. 9-20. At the time he made this award, Ms. Reed had not filed a Memorandum of Costs 
and Fees and Dr. Reed had not had the opportunity to object to any of her ,",'",au"u fees and costs. On 
24, 2011, a "''-'ITAn was R. Vol. 1, p. 96-97. 
In Medical Recovery Services, L.L.C. v. 145 Idaho 106, 175P.3d795 
court awarded attorney before a TnPtTIAr<> of fees and costs been 
of Appeals held that this was error and stated at 110 
2007), the 
Idaho 
"In this case, the magistrate acted prematurely and improperly at the January 23, 2006 hearing by 
awarding a specific amount fees before received a Rule 54(d)(5) memora.'1dum of costs 
and fees and Rule 54( e)(5) affidavit which are necessary for the application of the Rule 54(e)(3)factors." 
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Judge Wayman recognized his error. At the hearing which was held on November 7,2011, he found 
that the judgment attorney fees should not have been entered without giving Dr. Reed opportunity to 
challenge the amount under Rule 54. He set aside the judgment for attorney fees. TRANSCRIPT: Various 
Motions Hearings, p. 94, L. 5-11. On November 15, 2011, an Order was entered which set aside the 
February 24, 2011, $10,000.00 Judgment for Attorney Fees. R. VoL 3, p. 567-569. The Order further stated 
that if Ms. Reed wished to pursue her claim for an award of fees and costs, she was required to file an 
appropriate memorandum of fees and costs within 14 days. A Memorandum of Costs and Fees was filed on 
behalf of Ms. Reed on November 21,2011. R. VoL 3, p. 570-641. An Objection to and Motion to Disallow 
Attorney Fees and Costs was filed on December 2,2011. R. Vol. 3, p. 642-652. 
I.R. C.P .54( d)( 5) states that a memorandum of costs must be filed within 14 days after the entry of 
judgment. This Rule further provides that the failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to seek fees 
and costs. The last judgment (and the only final judgment from Dr. Reed's perspective) which was filed in 
the case was the Amended Decree of Divorce which was entered on June 20, 2011. R. VoL 1, p. 208-229. 
Ms. Reed did not file her memorandum of costs within 14 days of the date of the entry of the Amended 
Decree of Divorce. Dr. asserted this as one basis to deny the request for fees and costs in his Objection 
to and Motion to Disallow Attorney Fees and Costs referred to above. 
In ruling on 
to 
judgment for 
above 
a 
CHL',,"U.Uv,JJ objection, Judge Wayman stated that he did not think Ms. Reed was 
of and costs where he had set amount and entered a 
and costs. TRANSCRIPT: Januarv 23,2012 Motions Hearing. p. 6, L. 1-8. The 
jldedical Services Recovery, L.L. C case, however, would "0.aUii,,U otherwise. 
A warding a judgment for fees and costs requiring Ms. Reed to file a memorandum of fees and costs 
and without affording Dr. Reed the opportunity to object was premature and improper. Judge Wayman did 
not cite any for ruling his error in failing to follow the rules concerning seeking an award of 
attorney fees excused Ms. Reed from the requirement of filing a timely cost bill within 14 days of the date 
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of the fmaljudgment. 
In the next paragraph, Judge Wayman stated that after he had set the attorney judgment aside, 
had given Ms. Graham a date to timely file a memorandum of costs. Since she had complied, he found 
thatthe November, 2011, fee request was timely filed. TRANSCRIPT: January 23. 2012 Motions Hearing, 
p. 6, L. 9-14. 1.R.C.P .6(b) permits the Court to enlarge time if the request to enlarge time is made before 
the expiration of the period originally prescribed. This part of the rule was not applicable because no request 
for an enlargement of time to file a request for fees was made within 14 days of the date of the entry of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce in June of20 11. I.R.C.P .6(b) also allows the time to be enlarged after the time 
has run when requested by motion and upon a showing of excusable neglect. Ms. Reed did not move to 
enlarge the time to file her Memorandum of Fees and Costs nor did she claim that her failure to timely file 
a cost and fee request was the result of excusable neglect. Judge Wayman made no finding that the failure 
to timely file a fee request was the product of excusable neglect. Ms. Reed's request for an award of 
attorney fees and costs should have been denied because it was untimely. 
The only attorney fee statute cited in Ms. Reed's Memorandum of Fees and Costs was I.C.12-120 
(3), which pertains to the award of fees in a civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, 
bill, etc .. R. Vol. 3, p. 572. The Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs (R. VoL 3, p.570-64l) filed by 
Ms. Reed's attorney did not cite either I.C.32-704 or I.C.32-705 as basis for the request for fees and 
costs. In jl'UliJJl:J'J, L.P. v. lJun::u"",J' 140 Idaho 101 P. 3d 690, at page 
Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court held that "In order to be awarded attorney fees, a party must actually assert 
statute or other basis 
P. 2d 1035 (1999), Idaho Court held, in at page 424 Idaho, that the 
not empowered to award fees on a basis not asserted by the moving party. 
133 Idaho 420, 
Court was 
The Memorandum of Fees and Costs filed by Ms. Reed did not cite either I.C.32-704 or I.C.32-705 
as the basis of the request made by Ms. Reed. Judge Wayman erred in awarding Ms. Reed fees under 
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either of these two statutes when they were not stated to be the basis for the request for an award of fees. 
B: THE FACTS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL DO NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES 
tJNDER I.C.32-704 and I.C.32-705 
Judge Wayman's earlier award of attorney fees was made pursuant to the provisions ofI.C.32-704 
and I.C.32-70S. TRAl'JSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 71-72. Citing Jensen v. Jensen, 128 
Idaho 600, 917 P. 2d 757 (1996), Judge Wayman stated that a disparity in incomes is generally sufficient to 
justifY an award of attorney fees under I.C.32-704 (3), although an award might not be appropriate when a 
party has the fmancial resources necessary to prosecute or defend the action. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral 
Decision Hearing, p. 72, L. 6-14. 
Ms. Reed was awarded assets valued at $667,524.00. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
Hearing, p.69,L. 16-17. The debts awarded to Ms. Reed were in the amount of $238,061.00, with the net 
value of the award determined to be $429,463.00. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 69, L. 
18-20. Of this amount, $333,099.00 consisted offunds held in various retirement accounts. TRANSCRIPT: 
Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 62, L. 8-22. This award did not include the equalizingjudgment amount 
of$198,642.00 discussed above. The net award to Ms. Reed, when thisjudgment is taken into consideration, 
would be $628,105.00. Ms. Reed did not lack sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs which 
is a factor the Court must consider under I.C.32-70S(1)(a) and Judge Wayman did not so find. 
I.C.32-70S requires the Court to consider whether or not the person seeking an award of 
attorney fees is unable to support himself or herself through employment. At the time Judge Wayman decided 
to award Ms. Reed a portion of her attorney fees and costs, he mistakenly believed that she was making only 
about $20,000.00 per year. TRA"TSCRlPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 72, L. 18-23. She was making 
at least twice this amount working two days a week. She could have earned over $60,000.00 per year by 
working one more shift a week and the evidence established that she had been working three 12 hour shifts 
a week in 20 lOa few months before trial. 
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Judge Wayman made a mistake when he found that Ms. Reed was only making a little over 
$20,000.00 per year. Presumably he felt that Ms. Reed could not pay her attorney fees. This mistake is 
similar to the magistrate's misreading of an Exhibit in the Jensen case cited above which is discussed at 
pages 605 and 606 and which was found to have resulted in an incorrect analysis. This mistake should result 
in the reversal of the judgment for attorney fees and a remand back to Judge Wayman for a further 
determination with respect to whether or not Ms. Reed is entitled to an award of fees based on Ms. Reed's 
actual income level of $41,042.56 (plaintiff's Exhibit 43) and a potential income of over $60,000.00. 
In deciding to award Ms. Reed a portion of her attorney fees and costs, it is not apparent from the 
record that Judge Wayman considered the child support award of$1,190.00 per month commencing in 
February of 2011. TRAl'fSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearm!!, p. 36, L. 20-25, p. 37, L. 1. In Jensen, 
at page 606 Idaho, the magistrate's consideration of the child support amount as income in the context of 
determining whether or not to award fees under I.C.32-704 and I.C.32-705 was discussed and the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not find that this was error. 
Monthly billing statements from Ms. Reed's attorney are attached to the Memorandum ofF ees and 
Costs filed on November 21,2011. R. Vol. 3, p. 570-654. The pages show that Ms. Reed kept up with her 
attorney fees and costs as the case progressed and that as of January 2,2011, she had a zero balance owing. 
R. VoL 3, p. 629. Mr. Phelps stated that was the owner PCG Consultants. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, 
I, p. 24-25, p. L. 1. C to the Mt~miJrafl(l1Um of Costs was an invoice 
showing that as ofF ebruary 18, 2011, PCG Consultants had been 
3, p. 640. Ms. Reed 
June 19,2012, 
had the ability to pay her own attorney fees 
second Order and 
the amount of$10,000.00. R. 
costs. 
was pnt'pr~'rl 
R. VoL 4, p. 953-955. To avoid execution on this particular judgment, on July 9, 2012, Dr. Reed filed a 
Notice of Tender and paid Court the judgment amount of$10,000.00 plus an additional $100.00 to 
cover any accrued interest on the judgment amount. R. VoL 4, p. 960-964. On August 30, 2012, Ms. Reed 
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obtained an order from the Court requiring that these funds be paid to her. A copy of this was not included 
in the original Clerk's record but was attached to Dr. Reed's Statement and Motion to Augment dated 
November 26, 2013. The judgment for attorney fees and costs should be set aside and Ms. Reed should be 
directed to pay Dr. Reed, the sum of$10,100.00 plus interest on this amount from the date oftender on July 
9,2012. See Radermacher, cited above. 
v 
WAS IT ERROR FOR JUDGE WAYMAN TO ORDER THE TWO CORPORATIONS TO ISSUE 
STOCK MTI DELIVER THE STOCK TO THE SHOSHONE COUNTY 
July 8, 2011, Ms. Reed's attorney filed an affidavit and obtained a writ of execution for the two 
judgments that had been entered in February of2011. R Vol. 1, p. 230-239. A copy of this writ is at R. VoL 
1, p. 234. One of the two judgments was the February 2011, $10,000.00 judgment for attorney fees which 
was ultimately set aside as was discussed above. The other judgment was a money judgment for $198,642.00 
which was entered to equalize a property and debt division. 
The writ was given to the Shoshone County Sheriff's Office to execute on Dr. Reed's interests in 
both corporations. On July 15,2011, a return of service was filed with the Court stating that the Writ of 
been served on Terry Spohr as an agent for the corporations, but was being returned as 
UHe.au,:>"""" R. Vol. 2, p.307-316. In response to the Interrogatories which had been served on Mr. Spohr as 
the Olson, stated that no physical had 
ever been issued. She further stated that Dr. Reed had been paid $5,000.00 as a partial buyout of his 
Services, R. VoL 2, p. 310. 
On 18,2011, Ms. Reed, through filed an objection to the answers provided by the 
corporations concerning the stock in both corporations. R. VoL 2, p. 349-352. Part of the relief requested 
was an order from the Court requiring both corporations to issue the shares of stock Dr. Reed was entitled 
to receive and to deliver a sufficient number of shares to the Shoshone County Sheriff's Office to satisfY the 
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judgments. This motion was scheduled for hearing several times with the actual hearing on the motion taking 
place on September 28, 2011. 
On September 16, 2011, Dr. Reed filed an objection to Ms. Reed's Motion for Entry of 
JudgmentiOrderfor Issuance and Delivery of Stock. R. Vol. 2, p. 380-389. His objection was based on the 
grounds that neither judgment was fmal and that neither would support a writ of execution. R Vol. 2, p. 382. 
Additionally, he contended that both judgments had been superseded by the Amended Final Decree of 
Divorce which had been entered on June 11,2011 (R. Vol. 1, p. 208-229) and were no longer enforceable. 
R. Vol. 2, p. 382-383. With respect to the attorney fee and costs judgment, he also contended, ultimately 
successfully, that this judgment had been entered in error because Ms. had not been required to filed 
a memorandum of fees and costs and Dr, Reed had not been given an opportunity to contest the amount 
claimed. R. Vol. 2, p. 383-384. All of these arguments were raised in September 28, 2011 hearing 
wherein Ms. Reed asked Judge Wayman to order the corporations to issue stock and give them to the 
Shoshone County Sheriff. TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearings, p. 59-61. 
FEBRUARY 24, 2011 JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES: 
With respect to the judgment for attorney fees, Judge Wayman stated at the hearing which was held 
on September 28,2011, that an issue had been raised that could affect the $10,000.00 judgment for attorney 
fees. TRAl'fSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing, p. 66, 3-5. He that he did not feel that it would 
be appropriate to have an actual sale. TRA.N"SCRIPT: ~~~~=~-=.:==, p. 66, L. 11 At 
hearing which was held on November 7, 2011, Judge Wayman orally set aside the judgment for attorney 
fees. TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing, p. 94, L. 5-25, p. 95, p. p. 97, L. 1-7. On November 15, 
201 I, an Order was entered which set aside the February 24, 2011, $10,000.00 Judgment for Attorney Fees. 
R. Vol. 3, p. 567-569. 
As was stated above, Medical Recovery Services, L.L.C. v. Jones, 145 Idaho 106, 175 P. 3d 
795 (Ct. 2007), the trial court awarded attorney fees before a memorandum offees and costs had been 
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filed. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that this was error and stated at page 110 Idaho that: 
"In this case, the magistrate acted prematurely and improperly at the January 23,2006 hearing by 
awarding a specific amount of attorney fees before having received a Rule 54( d)( 5) memorandum of costs 
and fees and Rule 54( e)( 5) affidavit which are necessary for the application of the Rule 54( e )(3 )factors." 
In Garrens v. Roms, 85 Idaho 86, 327 P. 2d 964 (1962), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that for 
a valid execution to issue, it must be supported by a valid judgment. In Garren, the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated at page 90 Idaho that "Under the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States, a personal 
judgment rendered without service of process on, or a legal notice to the defendant, in the absence of a 
voluntary appearance, is void and not merely voidable." Similarly, on January 28, 2011, when Judge 
Wayman stated that Ms. Reed was entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs of $10,000.00 
(TRANSCRIPT; Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 74, L. 14-21), he had dispensed with the requirement that 
Ms. Reed file an affidavit in support of her request for attorney fees as was required by I.R.C.P.S4(e)(5). 
He had dispensed with the requirement that she file a memorandum of costs as was required by 1.R.C.P.54 
(d) (5). He had also dispensed with the requirement that Dr. Reed be afforded an opportunity to object to 
the fees and costs as was required by I.R.C.P.54 (d)(6). To the extent the Writ was based partially 
on the February 2011, attorney fee award (R. Vol. 2, p. 315) ,it was void. 
2011 JUDGMENT TO EQUAlIZE DISTRIBUTION: 
Under I.R.C.P.69, process to enforce ajudgment may only be issued to enforce a final judgment or 
a partial judgment which has been certified as final pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54 (b). In Goldman v. Graham, 
139 Idaho 945,947,88 P. 3d 764 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court defined the term '~udgment" as " .. .'the 
final determination of the parties in an action or proceeding."', (Cites omitted). The last sentence of 
I.R.C.P.54 (a) states that "A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection 
(b) (l) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by 
or against all parties in the action." In Cit. Financial Servo v. Herb"s Indoor RV Center, 108 Idaho 820, 
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702 P. 2d 858 (Ct App. 1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals held, in part, that an uncertified partial summary 
judgment will not support a writ of execution. Ms. Reed was not entitled to obtain a writ of execution based 
on the February 24, 2011 judgment for $198,642.00 because it was not a final judgment and because it was 
not certified as being final. 
On page 11, in paragraph XVII of the Amended Final Decree of Divorce CR. Vol. 1, p. 218) entered 
on June 20, 2011, Dr. Reed was ordered to pay Ms. Reed $198,642.00 as an equalizing judgment. This 
paragraph also stated that if Dr. Reed failed to make the payment, the Court would sign a civil judgment 
upon presentment. Similar language was set forth in the Amended Final Decree of Divorce with respect to 
the award of attorney fees on the bottom of page 11 and the top of page 12 of the Amended Final Decree of 
Divorce. (R. Vol. 1, p. 218-219). These provisions clearly superseded the same awards in the two February, 
2011 judgments and required Ms. Reed to obtain additional civil judgments before she executed. She did not 
do this. 
The two February 24, 2011, judgments merged into the Amended Decree of Divorce and were no 
longer in force as of the date the writ of execution was obtained on 12, 2011. The writ was not premised 
on valid judgments and Judge Wayman should have made this finding during the hearing which was held 
on September 28, 2011. 
If the writ had been valid, I.e.8-506C would give the 
to issue stock and deliver the stock to Shoshone County 
authority to order the corporations 
Office. As was discussed above, the 
writ of execution was founded on two judgments which were superseded by the Amended Final Decree of 
Divorce. One judgment was a partial judgment which would not support a writ of execution. The other 
judgment was for attorney fees which was void and was ultimately set aside. The execution on and the 
attachment of personal property under the provisions of I.e.S-501 et. seq. required valid judgments and a 
valid writ. (I.C.8-504 and Garren above). Because the writ was not valid, Judge Wayman was not 
authorized by 1.e.8-516 to order the garnishee corporations to deliver Dr. Reed's stock in Mountain Health 
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Services, P.C., and Mountain Health Care, Inc., to the Shoshone County Sheriff. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Wayman's valuation and award of the stock in Mountain Health Care, Inc.,to Dr. Reed should 
be set aside. The equalizing judgment which was entered against Dr. Reed should also be set aside. The 
judgment for attorney fees should be set aside. The Court should order Ms. Reed to deliver any money or 
property she received when she executed on these judgments to Dr. Reed. The matter should be remanded 
back to the trial court for further proceedings. 
, i ~ 
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November 11, 2010 
Mr. IYlichael G. Palmer 
Attorney at Law 
Palmer I George, PLLC 
923 North 3m Street 
Coeur d'Alene,.. ill 83814 
Re: Dr. Scott A. Reed - Mountain Health Care. Inc. 
Dear IYlichael: 
Attached are the preliminary calculations regarding the value of Dr. Reed's ownersbip 
interest in Mountain Health Care, Inc. Federal :income t~'{ returns from the Company 
indicate Dr. Reed owns a 22.97% interest the Company's stock. 
Our preliminary conclusions indicate that t..~e value of Dr. Reed's 22.97% ownersbip 
interest in the Company is worth $100,000. Tbis value is based primarily on the appraised 
value of the Company's real prope:rrf as of August 19, 2010. Tne value of the Company's 
other assets and liabilities reported as of December 31, 2009 have been estimated and 
represent a relatively insignificant pa....n: of the overall value. 
If you have any questions or concerns 
know. 
Respectfully Yours, 
Todd Carlson, CPA/i\.BV, CFF 
Moss Adams LLP 
Schedule 
the analvsis or our J...l.Uu..u..'lO.J, please let us 
DEFENDANrs 
! EXHIBIT 
r ."~:1.-~ ;; 
Schedule 1 
Dr. Scott R. Reed - Mountain Health Care, Inc. 
Net Tangible Assets 
Assets 
Cash & Cash Equivalents 
Uncollected Accounts Receivable 
Less Allowance for Production Adjustments 
Intercompany Receivable - Mtn Health Services PC 
Net Current T angibie Assets 
Land 
Construction in Progress 
Buiiding & Improvements 
Fair Market Value Adjustment to Appraisal 
Financial 
Statements 
Oeo-31-2009 
$ 125,590 
5,637 
227,651 
358,878 
200,000 
1,250,383 
1,850,079 
Adjustment I Estimated , Value Notes 
$ 125,590 
5,637 
(227,651) a 
.~ 
(227,651) '. 131,227\ 
~
200,000 
1,250,383 
1,850,079 
(800,462) (800,462) 
Total Building & Real Estate 3,300,462 (800,462) ~)b 
Office Equipment 
Medical Equipment 
Estimated Book Value @ 70% Cost 
Total Equipment 
Accumulated Depreciation 
Loan Fees 
Accumulated Amortization 
Total Other ,A,ssets 
Total Assets 
Liabilities 
Accounts Payable 
Payable to Shareholders, Net of Receivable 
Long Term Debt 
Total Liabilities 
TOTAL NET T ANG!8LE ASSETS - EQUiTY 
Ownership Percentage - Or. Reed 
~~ote3 
112,691 
235,393 235.393 
(104,425) (104,425) 
~
348,084 (104,425) ~ 
(998,117) 998,117 
17,811 (17,811) 
(~~I 
$ 3,023,330 $ (148,494) $I, 2,874,886 \ 
$ 
18,421 
38,066 
2,383,252 
2,439,739 
~
18,421 
38.066 
2,383,252 
2,439,739 
583,641 $ (148,494) $ 435,147 
22.97% $ 100,000 
======== 
a. Intercompany Receivable has been eliminated conSistent with the consolidated financial statements. 
The related payable should be removed as a liability of the related company in its valuation or treated 
consistently In the '/aluation of each individual entity. 
